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THE GOAL OF LAW
MAX RADINt
If there is such a thing as a method of law, there must be, if
we stick to etymology, a goal. "Method" means a path or a pro-
gress. Where does this path lead us to? What are we attempting
to reach as we go forward in the path of the law?
There really has never been any doubt about the answer, ex-
cept in the case of those persons who speak, as some extremely
eminent persons do, of "pure law." I confess I have never been
able to imagine what "pure law" could be, because the more I
examined the idea, the less it looked like law to me. I should say
the same for "pure morals" or "pure economics" or "pure soci-
ology." All these things deal with the relations of human beings,
and if the term "pure" is added to the word, it can only mean
that we are discussing law and morals and economics, as though
the elements involved were not human beings, but imaginary
entities, the abstract man, the homo iuridicialis the homo
economicus and so on. Unfortunately such entities do not exist.
To discuss their relations is, I suppose, quite possible. It is a
kind of mathematics and pure enough in all conscience. The
result is ingenious and interesting. But whatever else it is, it is
not law, nor morals, nor economics nor sociology.
If we go back to law, which is always about human beings and
really about nothing else, the goal has for many centuries been
declared to be justice, about which I shall have much to say in
this paper. As a matter of fact, there is a famous and ancient
formulation of this statement made by an eminent Roman law-
yer of the second century A.D., one Publius Iuventius Celsus. His
words are ius est ars boni et aequi, and they can be translated as
"Law is the technique of justice," or "of equity," which in this
t Late professor at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study.
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context means the same thing. You will find this Latin sentence
engraved in marble or stone or bronze on more than one court
house or similar edifice in the United States and elsewhere.
It is true that when this statement is made, we are likely to
encounter either the open derision of laymen or, what is even
harder to bear, some trite and silly facetiousness about the
incompatibility of law and justice. Unfortunately the layman's
sneer is occasionally supported by a kind of half-cynical self-de-
preciation on the part of lawyers, who are afraid of being
charged with a greater moral responsibility than they wish
to bear. They often protect themselves by saying that "justice"
is a vague word, that it involves arbitrary and emotional criteria,
that it can not be precisely defined.
Well, it is a hard word to define, and I have no intention of
defining it. But there are a great many other hard words in the
law which lawyers do not hesitate to use. "Contract" is a hard
word, and so is "tort" and so, above all, are words like "neg-
ligence" and "reasonable" and all these words are constantly
on the lips of lawyers who have no qualms whatever over the
fact that they could not "define" them, since "defining" means
indicating the precise limits which include just these terms and
no others. I think we shall find that "justice" is in most instances
recognizable without difficulty and on the whole, gives us less
trouble than a great many other legal words.
Celsus who used the formula was by no means a philosopher
or moralist, but a hard-headed and somewhat technical lawyer.
He doubtless thought he was uttering a truism, not propounding
a subtle paradox, and it is a truism. Law must be a device for
obtaining justice or it has no excuse for existing. Indeed, it is
historically demonstrable that except by announcing justice as
its goal law could never have come into existence.
The difficulty, of course, is not to determine whether it is
true, but to get a little closer to what it means. The temptation
is irresistible-you have noted that I have already yielded to
it-to speak of these facts in metaphors. "Goal" is a metaphor
and "technique" is another. So, for that matter, was "method"
originally. Some more elaborate metaphors in this connection
have a wide currency that comes from frequent repetition.
"Justice," it has been said, "is the port to which the ship of
the law is being guided over the vast sea of human experience."
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And Josef Kohler said: "Not so. It is the star by which we
steer."
Both of these are fine pictures, which we may cherish and
use, provided we remember that they are figures of speech.
Nor are they the only figures of speech which, unless we are
careful, we may mistake for sober reality. Almost inevitably
we find ourselves personifying "Law" and "Justice" and creat-
ing something very like allegories in which "Law," depicted
as an armed knight, goes questing, let us say, for "Justice" who
could so easily put on the garb of a distressed maiden. Or,
perhaps, "Law" is the troubadour, Blondel, wandering from
dungeon to dungeon till his imprisoned king sings the answer
to his song and so discloses his presence. I suppose we would
be adding a touch of absurdity, if we thought of the "Law"
seeking "Justice" in Darkest Africa and ultimately greeting it
with something like "Dr. Livingstone, I presume."
But after all, Law and Justice are not persons, any more
than they are ships or ports or stars, and they equally are not
disembodied forces acting like gravitation or electricity of their
own motion and in their own directions. They are words and
they are words used by men who have some purpose in using
them. What our job is, is not to define the words, but to try
to understand the purpose-really, the purposes-for which
they were and are used.
It turns out that even the separation of the two terms, so
far as we have separated them, is merely a convenience of
exposition. It is all very well to speak of law as the technique
of justice, or of justice as the goal of law, but it would be just
as correct to turn the phrase upside down, and say that justice
is not merely the goal and result of law but its source and that
it enters into every stage of the process of the operation of law,
as well as at the final stage when it becomes a test for deter-
mining whether the operation has really been successful in pro-
ducing law.
What we must be careful about is confusing the operation
of law with one of its elements, which is what we call "legal
procedure." In this there is a succession of connected acts cul-
minating in a result called a judgment. There is certainly noth-
ing more legal than a judgment, but neither the judgment nor
the procedure which results in it, is identical with the law. If
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we must attempt to describe the law-and we can describe it
without defining it-we can say it is a complex of ideas, or a
complex process of intellectual operations and that in this com-
plex in one way or another the notion of justice must enter.
If we use the touchstone of justice and we find that some part
of the complex does not react, we regard that part as a foreign
body to be removed at the first opportunity. You see once more
how hard it is to discuss these things without using figures of
speech.
I have said that I shall have much to say about "justice."
My purpose is not merely that of presenting views on the subject
but, also of accustoming lawyers to use the word. Fear of words
is one of the commonest of modern weaknesses and it is no-
where more apparent than among persons who loudly announce
that they are concerned only with facts or principles and that
they are loftily indifferent to mere words. Since, however, the
connection between law and justice is not only of the most inti-
mate sort, but is in fact a sort of imperfect fusion, lawyers
are prone to compensate by using almost any partially synony-
mous term, when they find it necessary after all to apply the
test by which law is to be made satisfactory to their minds. They
will say that a legal result to which they have been tentatively
brought or which is suggested in argument, is not "fair" or not
"reasonable" or not "equitable" but they will boggle at saying
that it is not "just," although that is precisely what they mean.
Historically there have been shifts in our attitude to the
words which embody legal valuation. At one time, terms like
"just" and "justice" were associated with a more or less mechan-
ical notion of compensation or retribution. They suggested a
kind of stern insistence on equivalence in dealing with human
conduct, especially if it was wrongful conduct. Phrases like
reaping what one has sowed, having measured out to you the
measure which you have meted, and, still more strikingly, to
be hoist by one's own petard, all these phrases which are vari-
ations of the notion of talion or retaliation, seemed simple and
undeniable justice. They occur in this sense and with this con-
notation in the New Testament as well as the Old, and one could
say, and did say, that this justice was quite fair and equitable.
But there was also-and at the same time-a parallel notion
of "equity" or "fairness" in which less than an exact equiva-
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lent was deemed a better means of securing a right result. It
was this notion of "equity" which in Christian Europe became
established as a corrective of "justice." It was associated with
"clemency" or "mercy," with a consideration of human frailty,
with allowance for adverse circumstances, with a locus poeni-
tentiae, a chance for repentance. And it expressed itself in a
famous Latin proverb which was deliberately put in the form
of a paradox, summurm ius summ4% iniuria, which may be para-
phrased as: "The extreme of justice is the extreme of injustice."
But today there has been a new shift and all these terms of
valuation, "just," "equitable," "fair," "reasonable," "right" are
treated as practical equivalents. They are the criteria of whether
the determination of what is lawful satisfies the conscience, or
at least, the sense of propriety, of the person judging. One of
our greatest difficulties is that so much of our discussion of
such matters consists of quotations of quotations of quotations,
in which words, which have been used for three millennia and
undergone all these semantic shifts are placed side by side on a
single temporal level.
Whatever the terms are, we know what we are doing with
them. We are attempting to evaluate the conduct of men, and
being lawyers, we do it in a particular way. We create a huge
systematized body of typical fact situations in which men are
involved and in which some acts and abstentions are declared
to be right and the failure to act or abstain, wrong; and another
set in which certain acts and abstentions are declared to be
right, but in which the failure to act or abstain is equally right,
or, at any rate, not wrong. And "right" and "wrong" are in
this context words which mean "in accordance with justice"
and "in violation of justice."
I have said that justice in many instances can be recognized
at once, and it is as well to get down to cases, even if we must
begin with quite general ones. Certainly we shall meet with
little dissent if we say it is right to keep a contract and at least
prima facie wrong to fail to keep it. If one has an option, on
the other hand, it is quite right to exercise it but equally right
to decline to do so. It is quite right for the owner of Blackacre
to order trespassers off his land and wrong for the trespasser
to be on it. But it is equally right for the owner to permit any
person to use Blackacre. And if John Doe has a right of way
Washington University Open Scholarship
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over Blackacre, it is quite right for him to walk across it, but
equally right for him to omit doing so.
These and many more striking situations which I shall take
up later, are unmistakably right or wrong, just or unjust. There
are literally hundreds of thousands of them, perhaps hundreds
of millions, and their enumeration, generally in a connected and
systematized form, constitutes most-not quite all-of what we
mean by law.
But if we could enumerate all of them, there would still be a
difficulty, and it is a major one. The words "wrong" and "right,"
"just" and "unjust" are legal words, but they are not exclusively
legal. As a matter of fact, moralists and ethical teachers claim
that primarily they are their property, and they often resent
use of them by anybody else. If we go back to what I have given
as unmistakable instances of acts-hereafter I shall regularly
include abstentions under "acts"-which are legally right and
just, it is fairly clear that they are also morally right. But we
do not have to go far to find a schism between these closely
related fields of thought.
If a man has a fertile farm, he has a right to cultivate it,
which is another way of saying he is acting rightly or justly
when he does so. And subject to crop-regulations he may grow
what he pleases on it. He also is acting rightly when he fails
to cultivate. And legally he is still acting rightly if he fails to
cultivate it, although there is at that moment a real need for
all the crops that can be grown. Would that also be morally
right or just? The answer will be somewhat uncertain, and it
will be difficult to attain certainty. But on the question of the
legal rights, there will be no uncertainty whatever.
The reason for this is that in the case of law, we have a
particular way of determining whether an act is right or not.
We have an institution, called a court, which will either say so,
or can be assumed to say so. And this statement will settle the
matter.
Not only will the court, if asked-it must, to be sure, be asked
in a certain way-answer the question, but it cannot help doing
so. It cannot refuse to answer. If it says loftily, as it some-
times does, that it will take no notice of the case, because it is
too unimportant, or slightly offensive - courts talk that way
about things like gambling or marriage-broker's commissions
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and such matters-what it is doing is deciding for the defendant.
Or, in other words, it says the situation presented to it is legally
right as it stands.
But in regard to moral right, we have in the first place no
assurance of finality and there is no compulsion on anyone to
decide it at all. We cannot dispute a court's judgment of what
is legally right. So long as the judgment remains unreversed
or unreversible by a higher court there can be no doubt about
the legal right involved. But judgment about the moral right,
depends for its acceptance on the authority of the person judg-
ing and may be disputed or qualified by anybody who questions
that authority.
I have given an example in which the divergence between the
moral judgment and the legal judgment of exactly the same
situation, is slight. There are many situations in which it is
more marked. Let me say here, first of all, that the divergence
is not caused by the court's indifference to the moral aspects.
It almost never disregards moral considerations. And, secondly,
we must note that while there are cases in which morally an
act may be wrong, while legally right, there are much fewer
cases-there are some-in which an act is morally right and
legally wrong.
In these overlapping groups of judgments, the single and
simple distinction is the one I have indicated. We have a definite
way of reaching a final judgment in law. In morals we cannot
get the same assurance of finality. Except for that finality, it
would be practically impossible to distinguish a moral judgment
from a legal judgment. We could not derive that distinction
from the fact that some moral judgments which we accept con-
tradict legal judgments of the same action, for we frequently
find two legal judgments of closely similar actions contradicting
each other, while remaining final legal judgments for the persons
concerned.
Justice, I may here repeat, has entered in to the formation
of the legal judgment at every stage of the process by which it
was arrived at. But, as has already been indicated, it comes in
again at the end, after the legal judgment has been arrived at
and especially if it has been merely tentatively arrived at. It
judges the judgment, or proposed judgment.
The legal expert on the bench who makes the legal judgment
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is a member of the moral community as well as of the legal one.
The two, of course, cannot be separated and historically never
were separated. It is impossible for him-literally impossible-
to avoid making a legal judgment. It is next to impossible for
him to avoid making a moral judgment. And if he makes the
two and finds that they disagree, he will almost certainly make
an effort to reconcile them.
Evidently, he can do that in two ways. In the case of the
moral judgment, he may question the authority by which it was
made. And he may do that all the more readily, since the mere
fact that he has found his legal and moral conclusion in contra-
diction, indicates, as I hope we shall see, that the moral judg-
ment is not quite crystallized. Or else, if he feels that the moral
judgment is, or should be, unassailable, he will examine the legal
judgment again, if it is still merely a tentative judgment, and
make an effort to recast it in order to avoid the contradiction.
But we must remember that both legal and moral judgments
are complex and by no means simple operations. In neither case,
is the judgment reached by inspection, as mathematicians says,
when they derive one equation from another without taking the
trouble to work it out. If it could be so reached, it would be
extremely unlikely that the two judgments would be in disac-
cord. In most situations involving what we call serious crimes,
murder, arson, rape, theft, mayhem, the moral judgment that
the acts are wrong is as immediate as the legal judgment to that
effect. But in much less sharply marked situations, moralists
as well as legal experts must do a great deal of searching and
weighing and balancing before they arrive at what seems a
satisfactory result.
Cases in which the moral and the legal judgment seem at first
blush in disagreement are sometimes called "hard cases" by
lawyers, and those lawyers who do not like to take much moral
responsibility have, in order to justify themselves-it will be
noted that they feel they need justification-invented the surly
maxim: "Hard cases make bad law." If we leave out of account
for a moment the fact that this begs the question, these gentle-
men may be referred to my Lord Blackburn, whom I should be
inclined to call the greatest common-law judge of the nineteenth
century, and certainly no sentimentalist. Blackburn declared
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that whatever value the maxim had, was more than neutralized
by the much more obvious fact that bad law made hard cases.
We take for granted that on a great many matters of legal
dispute, something could be said on both sides. The thousands
-the tens of thousands-of volumes of reports are evidence of
that fact, since they are nearly all reports of cases that have
got to the appellate courts which implies that generally there
was something to argue about. The open and shut cases are
usually not appealed. We are, however, prone to forget that
situations in which something could be said for or against a
decision in what is morally right, are by no means uncommon.
These situations used to be called "cases of conscience" and
they were treated just like cases of law. They were submitted
to more or less professional authorities who not only decided
them but published their decisions in books which made up the
literature of "casuistry" a term that has acquired a wholly un-
fair color of depreciation. And, just as in law-cases, the authori-
ties, the acknowledged and authenticated authorities, did not
always agree. We remember the lines of Pope:
Who shall decide when doctors disagree
And soundest casuists, like you and me?
The "doctors" here are "doctors of divinity" and not of medicine,
as is almost always the case when the word was used alone in
England up to the nineteenth century.
If we examine these books reporting "cases of conscience,"
we find that the similarity between them and reported cases at
law is very close indeed. It was usual to state the facts-a real
situation but presented in a more or less generalized form-to
give reasons first for the side ultimately rejected, and then to
give more fully the reasons for the other, the prevailing side.
In both instances, authorities are quoted and these authorities
were graduated in weight and persuasiveness, just as in the case
in law reported.
Now, the legal expert on the bench, the judge, is also a moral
expert, a casuist, no matter how much he fights shy of this
designation. He almost certainly will make a moral as well as
a legal appraisal of the situation he is asked to judge as right
or wrong, just or not just. He will be better satisfied if the
two judgments agree than if they do not. And he realizes that
he knows more about what is legally right than what is morally
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10 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
right. If he has thought about the matter at all, he knows that
in moral arguments as well as in legal arguments a certain
weight is given to tradition, and even to consistency-at least,
it is lear that casuists, like judges, are troubled by obvious in-
consistency. But he probably, and correctly, thinks that tradi-
tion and consistency should be given more weight in law than
they need be given in morals.
If, therefore, he has tradition and consistency on his side in
the legal judgment, he will be less perturbed than he otherwise
would be, if it turns out that his moral valuation would not agree
with it. We may remember that like all of us, the judge has an
appreciable inferiority complex when confronted with moral
concepts. And he has likewise in mind that a legal judgment
may well have consequences, quite practical consequences. The
awareness of that works back on the judgment itself.
I shall come back to these two considerations. But I should
like first to call attention to what is so often forgotten, because
of the tendency of human beings to see things as black and white,
or, to speak with the logicians, to confuse contradictories with
contraries.
One really should not speak of right and wrong in the law,
but of wrong and not-wrong, unjust and not unjust. And simi-
larly in cases of conscience, it is quite likely, and frequently
happens, that the situation is morally neutral. Either doing or
not doing a certain act may be called "not wrong." And in the
law, the tradition of right judgment was often based on con-
venience or utility. Morals may really not be involved at all.
In some cases, the legal tradition seems to have arisen rather
casually, but is none the less an established tradition in spite
of that fact.
There are many illustrations that can be given. Let us take
a situation in which a claim is made by the owner of stolen
property which has got into the hands of a person who has
bought it in ignorance of the theft. Either of these persons could
make a morally justified claim to the article. If we had no legal
tradition, if we were applying what is sometimes absurdly called
"cadi-justice" or "fireside justice," we could say that a decision
for either side would be just, or sufficiently just to leave no
conscientious scruples in our minds.
But the point is that we do have a legal tradition. And in
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accordance with it, we prefer the owner to the bona fide pos-
sessor, although in other matters we are inclined to favor that
ubiquitous darling of the common law, the B. F. P. The French
Civil Code has decided differently in effect by requiring the
owner, if he insists on his property, to reimburse the holder.
In doing so the French Code broke with the Roman law tradition
which, like that of the common law, believed that ownership had
a better right to protection.
One could, of course, make a case for the change instituted
by the Code Civil. Of the two claimants, both innocent victims
of a thief, the owner is not unlikely to have been guilty of a
slight negligence, which cannot be imputed to the present pos-
sessor, especially if there has been a number of intermediate
transfers. But what had perhaps more weight with the framers
of the Code was a feeling that if a man had acquired property
in a fashion that did not suggest any impropriety, it facilitated
commercial transactions if he was allowed to keep it. In the
law merchant, dealing with negotiable paper, this notion is con-
trolling.
I mention, merely by the way and not as a serious compromise,
what a very young man once suggested to me as a solution. Why
should the loss not have been divided? Why could it not have
been held that the owner gets the property back, if he pays half
of what the B. F. P. can show he has given for it, with addi-
tional adjustments that may be needed? It is an interesting
proposal. I can only say that I know of no legal system that
permits it. But I could not convince my young friend that the
suggestion had no merit.
Evidently, even if a common-law judge was of the opinion
of the French Code, he would not act on it. The maintenance
of a tradition-there being no doubt of the existence of the
tradition-seems quite definitely to the legal expert, a powerful
factor in justice, and especially when the tradition itself is about
as morally satisfactory as the contradictory would be. This is
a situation in which the tradition has weight by itself and not,
as is often the case in legal precedents by a kind of estoppel
against the court, on the theory that persons had relied on the
existence of the tradition. It could not be said that the owner
of the property had allowed it to be stolen, on the faith of the
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rule and that it would therefore be unjust to change the rule
without warning.
Now let me give another example in which two victims of a
wrong made contradictory claims for justice. A specific case
which occurred in California in pioneer days will serve as well
as another. It has melodramatic quality.
Deputy, the owner of a piece of land in San Bernardino County
was kidnapped by one Stapleford on July 29, 1858, who with
his confederates took him to a lonely mountain cabin near Ven-
tura and demanded that he sign a deed transferring the land to
him, Stapleford. On his refusal, Deputy was chained to the floor
by a leg, manacled, and then freed from his chains long enough
to have a halter placed around his neck and to be pulled up over
a beam on the cabin. Half-strangled, he was let down and, since
he still refused, he was pulled up twice again. In the intervals
of hanging he was whipped with a rawhide. Finally in fear of
imminent death, he signed the deed. He was held captive in the
cabin while Stapleford rushed back to the city, recorded the deed
and a little later sold the land to a Mrs. Willis for a substantial
sum, i. e. four thousand dollars. Deputy ultimately left the cabin
and made his way back as best he could. He promptly sued to
recover his land claiming, as he well might, that the deed was
void for duress. Mrs. Willis asserted that she was a bona fide
purchaser. Stapleford and his accomplices had, I need hardly
say, absconded.
This is what Mr. Justice Baldwin said in refusing the land to
Deputy.
It is to be regretted for the sake of public justice, that
the alleged outrage, in which the claim of the plaintiff to
the relief he seeks in the bill had its origin, cannot be re-
dressed by the restoration of the property of which he was
lawlessly deprived.1
Was the decision just morally or legally? Well the traditional
legal rule here is as clear and definite as in the case of theft.
Duress avoids such transactions as between the parties them-
selves. But if a bona fide purchaser appears, the common-law,
differently from the case of theft, prefers him to the former
owner, just as it would have done if Deputy had been induced
by fraud, to make the deed. The rule is the same as at Roman
1. Deputy v. Stapleford, 19 Cal. 302 (1861).
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law, coactus voluit tamen voluit. "He expressed his will under
compulsion, but he did express it."
I have heard lawyers and professors of law utter indignant
protests at this case, even when they admit the existence of the
traditional rule. And those laymen to whom I have told it, uni-
formly condemn the decision. Evidently, their indignation is
directed against Stapleford and against a time and place in
which such things could happen. But equally evidently, if Mrs.
Willis was in fact a bona fide purchaser, we have the same situa-
tion as before. We have two innocent victims of a peculiarly
villainous wrong-doer, and to favor either one would not be
unjust. In such a case, it can also not be unjust to follow a
traditional and established rule.
Laymen, I have stated, hearing of this case are all on Deputy's
side. And whenever I have presented the theft case to laymen-
intelligent and experienced laymen-they generally side with
the owner and accept the decision, although by no means unani-
mously. I do not think that what governs their reaction is a
general partiality for owners as against possessors. The reason
may be psychological. The dramatic elements in the coercion
case induce a ready identification with the victim. But on the
whole, the reason for the layman's reaction is based on a ques-
tion of fact. They doubt the bona fides of Mrs. Willis. She
might, of course, despite her claim, have been aware, or perhaps
she ought to have suspected how Deputy's signature was got on
the deed. In that case, Deputy would have got his land back.
And we realize suddenly that all we know about her good faith
is her statement. Not only that, but it is true that in most in-
stances, such good faith must be assumed, if it is asserted, until
the other side can prove its absence, which is usually quite hard
to do. To be sure, the champions of Deputy forget that all we
know about the outrage perpetrated on him is what he has told
us. We should like to believe him, just as Judge Baldwin seems
to have done. But even he inserted an "alleged." There is, as
you know, much virtue in the word "alleged." And Mrs. Willis'
counsel called attention to the fact that Deputy had allowed
forty-one days to elapse, before bringing this action to avoid
the deeds. Stapleford, unfortunately is not available as a witness
and in any case would scarcely have confirmed Deputy's story.
And this brings us to one of our basic difficulties.
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The law for lawyers appears, as I have said, as a system of
type situations. Many of them we know, or, at least, discuss
by means of tags which as a rule are single words, like duress,
fraud, theft and so on. In most cases, what is conjured up in
our minds by the tag is more or less like a line-drawing of a
picture, involving persons, but, let us say, faceless persons.
When we are confronted with a story, in which persons appear
who are anything but faceless, we almost instinctively put them
into one or the other of these outlines, or else we say that they
do not fit into them.
Unfortunately, when the story is told, it is what is unpleas-
antly called a dead dog. It is a story about the past-sometimes
long past--and in the coercion case, there is no way to recon-
struct the past except by the statements of parties who have a
definite interest in reconstructing it in a particular way. And
if both parties told what each believed to be the truth, we know
that they could at best only give us fragments of what actually
took place. A complete reconstruction is impossible and yet this
impossible task must be undertaken by the judge, or at the
common-law, by the jury under the judge's guidance.
The legal rule that in coercion cases, the bona fide purchaser
is preferred to the person coerced, must at one time have seemed
quite just to the community in which it grew up. In the case of
fraud, where the same rule prevails, we have abundant evidence
in European folk-lore, that a person who lets himself be swindled
is regarded as a fool, who is entitled to little sympathy. A
tougher age than ours thought much the same of the man who
yielded to menaces.
We have grown much softer. Suppose a modern jury is told
by the judge that if both Deputy and Mrs. Willis are telling
the truth, the whole truth, they must decide for her. But they
know that if they can find any evidence-it need not be much-
that Mrs. Willis might have had some inkling of the facts, they
could decide that her purchase was not bona fide and give the
land back to Deputy. If this is what they would like to do, they
would be inclined to find evidence in things and circumstances
which would not ordinarily seem convincing to them. They
would quite honestly believe that something was present-in this
instance, knowledge on Mrs. Willis' part-which they did not
really have adequate reason for believing.
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If our methods were different, the jury need not have recon-
structed the past in a way which, on reflection, they might even
admit was not likely to have been correct. Our procedure re-
quires decisions to be retrospective, although we know that the
past cannot really be made present. But conceivably our proce-
dure might disregard the past and consider only the present-
which is really the immediate future. In that case, assuming
that the jury believes both Deputy and Mrs. Willis, the question
would be whether, of the two, the much abused Deputy or the
comfortable Mrs. Willis, the former is not more entitled to the
land than the latter. I venture to think that a modern jury-
like most persons I have consulted-would have preferred
Deputy, although when the rule about duress was made, the
average lay-member of the community would have preferred
the bona fide purchaser. If we assume that we at the present
time evaluate the justice of the final judgment differently from
the way it was evaluated in ancient Rome and much less ancient
England, we should have to say that our ideas about what is just,
have changed.
Time may have no effect on natural justice which by definition
is immutable. I do not reject natural justice as a concept, but
I fear my notions about it would not be acceptable to many per-
sons who have discussed it. A great many ideas about what is
just have lasted a long while and are likely to last for centuries,
if not millennia, longer. But words like "eternal" and "im-
mutable" do not convey much meaning to me, and about many
situations that are or were unhesitatingly declared to be just, I
find that time does have a marked effect. And this gradual
change, while it is still in the process of changing, not only
affects the law, but affects the facts. The ancient maxim de-
clares that facts make the law: ex facto ius oritur. The law
which moves toward justice as its goal, sometimes does not hesi-
tate to make facts which will enable it to reach justice.
It is in matters of the penal law that the law is most frequently
tempted to make its own facts if it is to result in justice-which,
let us remember, is the same as saying if it is to be law in any
complete sense. And in these penal matters, our legal experts
do not have even as much leeway as they did, in the situations
just discussed. In those situations, either decision could be
defended as just and in both instances, in our common law
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systems, it was a tradition, not a legislative command that de-
cided the matter. But penal law nowadays is almost wholly a
matter of statute. When the statutes are old, they are not
infrequently based on moral valuations that are quite different
from those of today.
We know that in the eighteenth and the first third of the nine-
teenth century, England had a savage penal law. Thefts of ar-
ticles which were worth a few shillings were punished capitally.
And, as we know, this penal law was not a vestige of ancient
barbarism, but was created by a relatively recent series of stat-
utes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nor did these
ferocious statutes shock either the average citizens or those who
might be supposed to be the moral guides of the community.
Most persons would have said that as between hanging a thief
and feeding and keeping him in idleness in a prison which was
often more comfortable than the slum from which he came, it
was more in accordance with justice to hang him.
But there were juries and judges who found this severity
heavy on their conscience. When the facts were not really in
dispute, they sometimes discovered a way out by finding that a
valuable jewel was worth only ninepence and so saved a poor
wretch from hanging.
We need of course not go back to the eighteenth century for
examples. The newspapers have been full of examples in the
last few months of what is described as mercy-killings. A young
woman shot her father in order to spare him continued pain
from an incurable disease. A physician in New Hampshire
injected several cubic centimetres of air into the veins of a pa-
tient, painfully and slowly dying of cancer. The law so far as
it is recorded on the statute books or in the decided cases is quite
clear on the subject. These acts do not fall within the category
marked "justifiable homicide" and they do come within the cate-
gory marked "murder." When the categories of justifiable homi-
cide and of murder were established, there can be no doubt what
the moral valuation of such mercy-killing would have been.
At the present time there is considerable doubt. The public
is in two minds about their moral valuation. Certainly a very
large group holds that these acts are murder and some of them
hold this view as an inference from an unshakable religious
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dogma. But it is equally certain that many do not hold these acts
to be murder.
We know what happened. In one case, a jury found that the
daughter was insane at the time. I do not believe that they really
thought she was insane. In the other case, the jury found that
the patient was already dead, when the air was injected. I
gravely question whether all the members of the jury really
believed that. I say the jury found these facts although under
our procedure, a jury need make no finding of fact in such a
case at all, as juries are required to do in some countries of
Continental Europe. We in the United States merely infer these
findings. In any case, the jury was asserting a moral valuation
of an act which was not the valuation which existed when the
statute was made, but which has not yet crystallized sufficiently
so that it is likely to be asserted in a statute, although proposals
to do so have been urged and are being urged.
The illustrations which I used first found Smith and Robinson,
John Doe and Richard Roe, before the court, making contradic-
tory claims about what was just. In all cases, however, each
limited his claims to what was just for him, as against his op-
ponent. In the penal cases, justice is more generalized. Whether
the defendant shall suffer or not, is not measured by the con-
flicting claims of another person - although there usually is
another person affected-but by something we call "Society," i.e.
a personification of a large group of persons, and the "justice"
of punishment is stated to depend on the harm or absence of
harm done to the basis of social living.
This personified entity called "Society" will enter the picture
to some extent, whenever we speak of justice and it is well to
remember that, being a personification, "Society," or "the Pub-
lic" or any similar group-term, is not a real person, at any rate,
not as real as actual flesh and blood persons. It is a conventional
shorthand for the fact that flesh and blood persons are found
only in socially organized groups and that the conditions which
make social living possible or convenient, or which improve or
injure this way of living, are important values. When we devel-
oped the concept of "crime" as we did from at least four
separate sources, we used it as a means of identifying acts of
individuals which reduced or to some extent destroyed the con-
ditions of satisfactory social life. We find it just to try to pre-
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vent such acts and to eliminate temporarily or permanently those
individuals who do them or are likely to do them. This aspect of
justice loomed so large in medieval times that the term "justice"
was not infrequently used as a synonym for the gallows.
One of the advances in the growth of this particular aspect
of justice which we hoped we had made, was that to be just
punishment must be individual, and not by groups. That one
man shall suffer for the fault of another, has seemed the very
essence of injustice. This idea is ancient enough, but it was by
no means universal and has had to make headway against the
opposing notion which can best be symbolized by such phrases as
"group-guilt" or shall we say? "guilt by association."
In ancient and primitive society, guilt by association, espe-
cially if the association was one of the oldest, if not the oldest
one-to wit the family in its largest sense-was taken as a
matter of course. It was very common in Greek society, even
when the Greeks had reached a degree of civilization which in
some respects is still unparalleled, while in another ancient soci-
ety, that depicted in the Bible, we see this ancient notion in
existence at one stage, and then see it displaced at another and
higher stage.
The Bible, as we know, is not a book written at a set time, but
is composed of fragments of a great literature which have a
range of well over a thousand years. In one of its ancient parts,
the Book of Joshua, which depicts the invasion of settled ter-
ritory by a confederation of rude tribesmen, we are told how
Achan took of the spoil of Jericho, "the accursed thing," which
had been formally consecrated to God, and how he was put to
death and with him, his sons and daughters, his oxen and his
sheep. It sounds cruel enough to us, but it was taken as a mat-
ter of course, when these things happened, somewhere around
1200 or 1300 B.C., especially if, as in this instance a religious
sanction was involved.
But if at that primitive stage, the notion of family solidarity
in trespass was still present, it yielded fairly early among the
Jews to a rule more in accordance with our notions of justice.
We read in II Kings 4: 6, how King Amaziah of Judah about the
year 800 B.C. punished the murderers of his father. And the text
goes on:
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The children of the murderers he slew not, according to
that which is written in the book, of the law of Moses,
wherein the Lord commanded, saying: The fathers shall
not be put to death for the children, nor the children for the
fathers, but every man shall die for his own sin.
The "book of the law of Moses" is Deuteronomy 24: 16 and
the principle is more emphatically and fully restated in an entire
chapter of the prophet Ezekiel, (Chap. 18), who lived about
570 B.C.
If we recall that more than four and a half centuries after
Amaziah-obviously still more centuries after Deuteronomy-
and more than two centuries after Ezekiel, Plato set forth that
in his ideal commonwealth-a little less ideal, to be sure, than the
Republic-the children of a traitor and murderer were to be
punished as well as the criminal himself, if we have that fact
in mind, we may note with gratification that what in the modern
world has been taken as one of the bases of our civilization, the
Bible, had reached this concept of justice, so long before even the
wisest of the Greeks had attained to it.
It is therefore all the more distressing that in the United
States a silly group-hysteria has caused the revival of a principle
discarded in Judah three thousand years ago. It is true that
those condemned "by association" are not put to death, but
merely publicly defamed and black-listed as potential traitors.
That is no mild punishment and the irresponsible publicists who
inflict it, might with profit have their attention called to Deuter-
onomy, the Second Book of Kings and the book of prophet
Ezekiel.
There is, however, another group of situations in which the
notion of responsibility has developed, so far as our standards
of justice are concerned, in a somewhat different way. Every
man, as it is written, shall die for his own sin, and not for the
sin of someone else. This, I think, is fundamental and today un-
questioned-or ought to be unquestioned-justice. Is it also
just that no one shall make good a trespass except the one who
causes it?
The law on the subject is considerable and for many situ-
ations, we can trace the changes it has undergone, fairly easily.
If popular opinion is a test of justice in the matter, it is not too
difficult to determine it, even though the situations involved
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do not have the emotional connotations of some we have dis-
cussed. I have disregarded the discredit into which samplers of
public opinion have fallen, because of a notable discrepancy in
November 1948, between prognostication and the event, and
have put to a casually gathered group of laymen-male and
female-the following two questions.
(a) John's minor son, aged ten, seriously injures Richard by
throwing a stone at him. Should John be liable for damages?
(b) John's wife, Mary, seriously injures Richard by negli-
gently running over him in her car. Should John be liable?
Almost-not quite-unanimously, this group of adult, intel-
ligent laymen said "Yes" to the first question and "No" to the
second, and were a little angry and more than a little annoyed
when they were told that the common-law was of the opposite
opinion in both instances and that only in the second has the
common-law recently-and not everywhere--been changed by
statute.
In the French Code which in 1804 generalized what we should
call the idea of the tort in two famous sections, 1384 and 1385,
it was laid down, first, that any one who causes damage by his
fault must pay for it and, secondly, that parents must make good
the torts of their children, teachers, those of their pupils while
under their care and masters, those of their employees while the
latter acted for them. But husbands were relieved from respon-
sibility for the torts of their wives.
This formulation was made while the older common-law was
still in force in the English-speaking world. The contrast is
curious and striking. It can easily be explained by legal histori-
cal tradition. It is not so easy to explain it as a result of social
and economic factors. But, as we know, except in the case of
children, the law of the two legal areas-common-law and civil-
law-have become assimilated somewhat, and the moral judg-
ment is quite the same at the present time.
Of the situations in which one person is required to make good
some one else's fault, the most important is, of course, that in-
volving employer and employed. The rule of vicarious liability
embodied in the Latin phrase, respondeat superior, is pretty
generally accepted. It is one which involves a great many com-
plications which I shall not undertake to examine here, but in its
broad aspects it seems, I think, to most persons, professional
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and lay, reasonably just. But if we ask ourselves why it seems
so, we shall find that the justice is taken to lie not in the situation
itself, but in an economic fact.
When a servant or employee injures a third person, it is as
a rule futile to tell the injured person to demand compensation
from the actual tort-feasor. The latter is highly unlikely to have
the means of giving it. The employer, however, is not only much
more likely to be in a position to do so, but has methods of pro-
tecting himself in a way I should like to discuss a little later.
This economic factor, I feel sure, is the most probable ration-
alization of the rule of respondeat superior. It is to some extent
another example of what I have illustrated before, i.e., of choos-
ing between two victims of a situation in which loss is caused,
and placing the burden of the loss upon one rather than the
other. But the result is determined not by traditional legal rule,
but upon the economic fact that one of the two is more able to
bear the burden. There is, to be sure, a social factor involved,
since in older stages of our society there is a kind of identifica-
tion of master and servant that is traceable to the much more
complete and more ancient identification of master and slave.
The idea that it is just that a master-who cannot be shown to
be at fault-shall make good the injuries in which his servant
is at fault, is fairly well established, and quite old, if we assign
its origin to the social factor of the quasi-identity of the two. But
it is a very recent doctrine that there may be liability without
fault of any kind. One of the striking examples of that is the de-
velopment since the late nineteeth century of workmen's com-
pensation acts.
When in 1804, the French Code Civil in its section 1384 at-
tempted to formulate a general statement of liability, it could
scarely fail to attach liability to fault-someone's fault. In doing
so, the codifiers progressed much farther than the common law
had done at that time or, as a matter of fact, have done since.
But neither in France nor England in 1804, could the situation
have been foreseen which created the idea that compensation for
damage caused could both be justly required even if it were dam-
num absque iniuria, and justly imposed on a particular person or
group of persons who were not demonstrably at fault directly
or indirectly, or even who were demonstrably not at fault.
The situation was, of course the industrial revolution of the
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19th century in which production of consumer-goods or the
carrying out of great construction enterprises became a matter
of concentration of many thousands of workmen, operating
powerful machines. To attempt to fit this situation into patterns
connected with such keywords as "negligence" or even "re-
spondeat supewior" produced a socially highly undesirable result,
in that everyday tasks without which modern society could not
be maintained, threw great burdens on just those groups who
were least able to bear them. This was made worse by the
astounding case of Priestley v. Fowler in England, in which Lord
Abinger set up the indefensible fellow-servant doctrine. But on
the Continent, where the fellow-servant doctrine was never
accepted, the obvious fact that fault, even if present, could
almost never be proved by the victim of it, set in motion those
movements which ultimately resulted in Compensation Acts-
on the Continent incidentally before they were known in the com-
mon-law area.
The older among us may remember the outcry which conserva-
tively minded judges and lawyers raised against the new doc-
trine. In some cases, no doubt, the outcry was motivated by the
sympathies felt by these persons for the large property interests
which were deemed to be impaired. But in many instances there
was a real moral shock at what, abstractly considered, must be
admitted to be unjust, to wit that liability should be imposed
without fault of any kind. A certain number of judges believed
the statutes to be unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Henshaw of
California dissented from his brethren in the case of West Indus-
trial Co. v. Pillsbury (170 Cal. 686, 732) in the following words,
among many thousand other words:
In plain language and stripped of obscuring verbiage this
is nothing else than the taking of the employer's property
from him without compensation, without consideration and
without process of law and giving it to another for his pri-
vate use.
Mr. Justice Henshaw will carry little weight on the side of
morality. He was forced off the bench for taking a bribe esti-
mated at half a million, in the litigation involving the estate of
Senator Fair. But he expressed what morally better men than
he felt on the subject. For example, Dean Pound is reported
recently to have rejected not only this type of liability without
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fault, but even the entire body of law centering about the rule
of respondeat superior.
The establishment of workmen's compensation was the work
of statutes and in some juridictions where such statutes have
not been passed, the fellow-servant doctrine still prevails. But
our courts were enabled to judge the justice of the new system
when they examined its constitutionality, although they carefully
avoided saying in so many words that what was unjust was with-
out due process of law. And certainly it would not be safe to say
that any unjust statute would be held void as against due
process. But the courts-Mr. Justice Henshaw dissenting-
would scarcely have held, as they did, that these statutes were
after all within the Constitution, unless they found the result
just.
There were doubtless several bases for that finding. There
was the practical matter I have mentioned, that an injured
workman could almost never prove that fault had been com-
mitted. There was the further fact that under modern factory
conditions it was not easily possible for workmen to avoid some
contributory negligence, which, by ordinary rules, would deprive
them of redress. But the most important element in the new
valuation was the entry of a new person in the litigation, the
person we call the Public, whom we met briefly a little while ago
when we called him "Society." And whatever he is called, let us
remember, he is not a creature having dimensions, limbs and
viscera, but a construct, a symbolic expression, a word-but a
highly significant word, pointing to a great many immensely
complex interests of a great many flesh and blood persons.
When the court made its valuation of just and unjust in
most of the illustrations I have used, it had in mind what was
relatively just and unjust between two parties. It was inclined
-in fact it was often a matter of duty-for the court to refer
its valuation to more general situations and the larger and more
general it could make it, the greater satisfaction it got out of
it. But in crimes and in such matters as obligation without
fault, it professed to consider a new party, "Society" or "The
Public." What writ summoned this party before the tribunal?
And why should its interests override those of other parties,
unmistakably and properly there?
We may leave out of consideration for a moment the fact
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that it is Society organized in a special way, i. e. as a political
system called the nation or the state, which has created the
courts whose judgments we accept as final. We have gone on
the assumption that these judgments, although for the most
part determined by justice, are not always so determined and
that it is open to us to judge a judgment and declare it unjust
if by our stanards we find it so. The fact that the judge who
makes the valuation of conduct on the basis of justice gets his
power from this political organization, may compel him to obey
the orders of those who speak for the politically organized com-
munity, but does not make any interests of the community,
either in its political form or in its broader form, superior to
any interest of any person or persons.
There are certain public or society interests which are obvi-
ously of such value that when they are imperilled, we may find
it just to disregard all or any interests of an individual. We
do this in the obvious case of crime, as we now understand it.
The safety of the lives, persons and property of individuals
living in our society is an important interest. If an individual
is of such a character that his freedom or his continued existence
endangers our lives we find it just to imprison or even to kill
him. We must, if we wish to be honest with ourselves, make
clear that this danger really is present, but where our lives are
involved, we are likely to accept proof which is less than over-
whelming. In their different degrees, this is true of all crimes,
but even here, we reserve the right to judge by justice whether
some acts are properly called crimes.
And just as what affects the basis of "social living"-pro-
vided we offer proof that it does-creates an interest which is
better than some or all interests of individuals, so we find it
just if in the organized state, the fact of organization is treated
by judges as a more valuable interest than the interests of an
individual. Treason which imperils the fact of political organi-
zation is a real crime and there are acts approximating treason
which are real crimes and it is a just valuation which says that
the freedom and the property rights and in extreme cases, the
lives of those who do the acts, properly defined as treason or
resembling treason, should be forfeited. Every case is a special
one and in every instance we must be convinced that the organi-
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zation was threatened and that the acts were done. But this
is so for any crime.
Society or the Public has entered these cases as a party on
a plea of self-protection, a plea which may be justly allowed,
if it can be substantiated. It enters them either as the sole
plaintiff, as in treason, or it displaces the victim of the crime,
who in ancient society would have been the plaintiff. But as
we have seen there are situations in which both the contesting
parties remain before the court, but Society nonetheless inter-
venes and claims that its interests are affected. It throws its
interest on the side of one or the other of the litigants and
when it does so, it is almost always the case that it determines
the judgment. Whether it also determines justice, is what we
must examine.
There is a legal theory called the "sociological" one which
makes justice always consist of "balancing interests." When-
ever the community intervenes, the balance is obviously dis-
turbed. In nearly every instance, the intervention, as in the
case of vicarious liability or workmen's compensation, results
in profit by one or the other litigant. The difficulty lies in oper-
ating this balance.
As usual there is a metaphor involved and one, which is per-
haps not the most apt. I fear it is derived from the picture of
the blind goddess holding up a pair of scales. But weighing
and balancing presume what we simply have not got, a single
and available standard of measure. We are told in the Chapter
of Holiness (Leviticus 19: 35):
Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment, in meteyard;
in weight or in measure.
And again (Deut. 25: 14-15):
But thou shalt have a perfect and just weight, a perfect
and just measure shalt thou have.
That is certainly our difficulty. Can we avoid divers measures,
a great and a small? If we insist on a single one, an inch, let
us say, or an ounce, the unanswerable question is, how many
inches of an individual interest equals how many inches of a
communal interest? Or how many ounces? In totalitarian com-
munities, the slightest suspicion of a public interest over-rides
any individual interest, whatever its extent. That is surely not
our position. And on the other hand, great and extensive com-
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munal interests are often plainly present, and to pretend to
ignore them or to say that a trumpery claim of John Doe must
be satisfied, whatever communal interest is affected, does not
make good sense.
Just what is a communal interest? We can readily under-
stand individual interests in litigation. As between plaintiff
and defendant, one of the two will or will not have to pay
money, give up property, go to jail. Those interests are not
difficult to measure or estimate. But how do we estimate a com-
munal interest, since we know that Society or The Public or
The Community is not going to jail and will lose neither money
nor other property.
What we are really doing is taking the situation created by
the judgment between John and Richard and making it general.
Which judgment, the one for John or the one for Richard, if
multiplied by the number of times it occurs, produces the great-
est advantage to the greater number of people? If there is only
a slight superiority, we are not likely to think that communal
interest is involved. If the superiority in the number of persons,
beneficially affected is very great, we can use that fact intelli-
gibly by permitting this substantial superiority to be a deter-
mining consideration.
Let me go back to what seems to me to be a special phase of
the problem of liability without fault. In the case of Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Compcmy of Fresno2 a girl in a restaurant
picked up a Coca-Cola bottle which exploded in her hand and
caused her serious injury. The girl was without fault, and there
was no direct evidence of fault on the part of the company or
the intermediate dealers. However the girl was allowed to re-
cover damages.
I shall omit the methods which the court declared it had fol-
lowed in reaching this conclusion. Suppose we proceed to "bal-
ance interests," understanding by that phrase what I have just
suggested. If the judgment in this case is generalized, people
who manufacture things for general sale, are liable to any one
who without direct proof of negligence is injured by some
wholly unforeseen accident in the manufacture of the article.
If the case had been differently decided, any one who bought
something generally advertised and sold, ran a risk of injury
2. 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
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from a danger from which he could not protect himself. If the
court decided this case on the basis of communal interest-it
did not say that it did, but I believe that this idea strongly
influenced it,-it must have had in mind that one decision was
of far greater benefit than the other to an extremely large num-
ber of persons.
This situation could be regarded as merely a variant of those
already discussed as examples of vicarious liability or liability
without fault. In all these cases, it is a question of distributing
loss and placing the burden on one of the two litigants. But
while the distribution in the other cases could have been guided
by consideration of justice, in this case it seems to be determined
by "communal interest," as I have sought to define it.
Can we say that communal interest and justice are the same?
It is evidently a question of degree. Courts have hesitated to
imprison a man for contempt 'of court, if he refused to work
in order to support his wife. They have hesitated less, when
it was a question of supporting a minor child. The communal
interest exists in both cases but, I submit, it is obviously stronger
in the second. It is to the public interest that men shall pay
their debts and equally to the public -interest that mortgages
shall be safe investments. But harsh foreclosures and deficiency
judgments are commonly regarded as unjust. We cannot after
all identify communal interest with justice, because we can have
communal interest without taking moral satisfaction in the fact
that the communal interest has been served. Justice, however,
requires this moral satisfaction.
I have tried to keep on a mundane plane. Are we leaving it
when I speak of "moral satisfaction"? I do not think so. There
are many situations in the law in which justice is neutral and
the decision gives us no moral satisfaction because of that fact.
But it also does not arouse moral dissatisfaction. There are
marginal cases in which our conscience speaks with an uncertain
voice. But we shall find that where justice is clearly involved
and where one decision gives obvious moral satisfaction and the
other does not, the law speaking through its formal instruments,
the courts, moves toward justice, although it often pretends
that it does not concern itself with matters like that.
It is my considered opinion that the suspicion and distrust
of the judicial process which is so marked in the general public,.
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would be. vastly reduced if courts explicity and in set terms
indicated both the situation in which justice controlled their
decisions and those in which it did not, for the simple reason
that decision for either side would be just. This would still
leave a residue of cases in which the court, without embarrass-
ment or breach of decorum, could indicate frankly that the con-
clusion to which it has come is patently unjust but was forced
upon it by statute or by a strongly established rule. Courts do
all these things occasionally. I should be glad to see it become
a regular practice.
Justice both in law and morals has been defined and classified,
redefined and sub-classified. I think that all these attempts to
make precise what cannot be made precise, are to little purpose.
Justice is a communal valuation or rather a series or a complex
of such valuations which are sometimes found in conflict when
expressed in formulas. These valuations were not agreed upon
at a given moment. When the term "justice" was first used, the
acts characterized as "just" had been matters of habit and tra-
dition for many generations, just as many other kinds of moral
duties had been instinctively performed long before people were
conscious either that they were doing them or that they ought
to do them.
Side by side with the communal valuations which had become
traditional, there is in our society another set of valuations.
These are part of a definite religious philosophy which at an
historically ascertainable period was accepted by our society
as an act of faith. It is here that contradictions were particu-
larly found because the communal valuations we should infer
from conduct are not those publicly announced as controlling.
We have to take into account the unfortunate moral dualism
which makes the values we profess higher than the practice we
take for granted. We have further to allow for the fact that
communal values at the periphery of our area of conduct change
under our very eyes and we cannot always be sure of the direc-
tion of the change.
The court consists of men like us and their valuations are to
a great extent those that we make. But the court is part of
mechanism which must work in a certain way. Those who com-
pose it find sometime that they are committed to giving effect
to values that have either been discarded or are in the process
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of being discarded. When that takes place, there is no reason
why they should not say so. They will do well to get rid both
of their fears of being called "moralists" and their shamefaced-
ness at being credited with a conscience. We shall get a better
law, in the sense of a clearer as well as a more enlightened one,
if courts abandon the pretense that law moves of itself and is
directed to no goal except that of completing its own operations.
Neither law nor justice, if I may be permitted to repeat what
I began with, is a force or a person or a star or a port. They
are both words which indicate a complex of ideas and actions
which are illustrated in our imagination by a great many type-
situations. We cannot give every aspect of this complex definite
outline and permanence of content. There are many aspects
which have not changed much for centuries or even millennia,
and these are familiar and easily ascertainable. Even here we
dare not guarantee immutability and eternity. It is not sur-
prising that there are considerable areas of conduct where our
valuations are tentative and our assurance of moral satisfaction
in making them, much less than certain. It is one of the penal-
ities of being human.
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